Function Allocation between Automation and Human Pilot for Airborne Separation Assurance by Lewis, TImothy A. et al.
     
Function Allocation between Automation and Human Pilot  
for Airborne Separation Assurance 
 
 
Husni Idris* Gabriele Enea** 
Timothy A. Lewis*** 

* TASC an Engility Corporation Company, Billerica, MA 02182 USA                                                                                         
(Tel: 617.780.0987; e-mail: husni.idris@engilitycorp.com) 
** TASC an Engility Corporation Company, Billerica, MA 02182 USA                                                                                        
(e-mail:gabriele.enea@engilitycorp.com) 
*** NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681 USA 
(e-mail: timothy.a.lewis@nasa.gov) 
Abstract: Maintaining safe separation between aircraft is a key determinant of the airspace capacity to 
handle air transportation. With the advent of satellite-based surveillance, aircraft equipped with the 
needed technologies are now capable of maintaining awareness of their location in the airspace and 
sharing it with their surrounding traffic. As a result, concepts and cockpit automation are emerging to 
enable delegating the responsibility of maintaining safe separation from traffic to the pilot; thus 
increasing the airspace capacity by alleviating the limitation of the current non-scalable centralized 
ground-based system. In this paper, an analysis of allocating separation assurance functions to the human 
pilot and cockpit automation is presented to support the design of these concepts and technologies. A task 
analysis was conducted with the help of Petri nets to identify the main separation assurance functions and 
their interactions. Each function was characterized by three behavior levels that may be needed to 
perform the task: skill, rule and knowledge based levels. Then recommendations are made for allocating 
each function to an automation scale based on their behavior level characterization and with the help of 
Subject matter experts.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A principal function of air traffic management is separation 
assurance, which is responsible for maintaining minimum 
separation distances between aircraft and from hazardous or 
restricted airspace. This function is performed predominantly 
by air traffic controllers based in air traffic control facilities 
using radar surveillance of aircraft location and voice 
communication with pilots. Each controller is assigned a 
volume of airspace with a maximum number of aircraft to 
control simultaneously thus imposing capacity limits based 
on their workload. Therefore, currently this function is 
centralized with ground-based controllers. 
With the advent of technologies such as the satellite-based 
automatic dependent surveillance and broadcast (ADS-B), 
aircraft can maintain awareness of their own position and 
share it with their surrounding traffic. Hence, concepts of 
distributed, airborne-based separation assurance have 
emerged, where aircraft equipped with ADS-B are delegated 
the responsibility of maintaining separation with their 
surrounding traffic, partially or completely. Distributed 
separation assurance promises to increase airspace capacity 
by mitigating the centralized workload limitation of the air 
traffic controller. However, due to pilot workload limitation, 
it is believed that automation in the aircraft cockpit is needed 
to enable the new separation responsibilities. NASA has 
developed a prototype of such automation, called the 
autonomous operations planner (AOP) and a concept for 
autonomous flight rules (AFR) (Wing 2011). NASA has also 
conducted several human-in-the-loop experiments to assess 
the feasibility of the concept using the AOP prototype (Wing 
2010). AOP detects potential violations of the separation 
requirements between aircraft, called conflicts, based on 
shared ADS-B surveillance and intent information. AOP 
advises the pilot of trajectory change maneuvers that resolve 
these conflicts.      
A key design question for airborne-based separation 
assurance is the allocation of functions between the human 
pilot and the automation. This question has been addressed 
implicitly relying primarily on elicitation of subject matter 
experts, engineering judgment, and human in the loop 
experiments, which are typically conducted in limited 
contexts in order to enable high fidelity prototype design and 
development. In this paper, a more thorough function 
allocation analysis for airborne-based separation assurance is 
presented, using AOP as a guiding example, but addressing 
functions that may not have been considered in the AOP 
design. A similar analysis was conducted for ground-based 
separation assurance (Landry 2011), which recommended 
additional functions such as traffic intensity avoidance. 
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Landry developed a top-down task analysis approach to 
identify key separation assurance tasks and then 
recommended function allocations using the automation 
levels developed by Sheridan (Sheridan 1992).  
The approach of this function allocation assessment consisted 
of: (1) A task analysis to identify the main functions of 
separation assurance. (2) Formal modeling with the help of 
Petri Nets in order to highlight the interactions between the 
tasks. (3) Characterizing key tasks by the behavior level 
needed to perform them according to Rasmussen’s skill-
based, rule-based and knowledge-based levels (Rasmussen 
1983) and correspondingly allocating them to an automation 
scale based on Sheridan’s automation levels (Sheridan 1992).  
The analysis approach is detailed in the next section 
including these three components. This is followed by two 
examples demonstrating the application of the analysis to two 
main separation assurance functions, conflict detection and 
conflict resolution. Finally, an overall function allocation 
analysis of a larger set of key separation assurance functions 
is presented based on elicitation of a small group of subject 
matter experts. 
2. Analysis Approach 
The approach of this function allocation assessment consisted 
of the following elements:  
2.1 Task analysis 
The separation assurance tasks were identified in an abstract 
framework independently from who may perform them to 
enable identifying possible function allocation schemes. The 
separation assurance tasks were initially divided into four 
high level tasks:  
(1) Conflict Identification (CI): Identify potential loss of 
separation (LOS).  
(2) Conflict Assessment (CA): Determine the need to 
resolve a conflict based on its severity.  
(3) Resolution Selection (RS): Select a resolution maneuver 
for the conflict.  
(4) Resolution Implementation (RI): Implement the 
resolution through communication and maneuvering.  
Then, these tasks were divided into subtasks gradually 
whenever a function was too complex to be allocated to the 
human or to the automation. Scenarios were used to provide 
context where AOP and the AFR concept were used as an 
example automation instantiation. However, additional tasks 
that AOP did not consider were identified. Two scenarios, 
one for conflict detection and one for conflict resolution, are 
presented as examples in the next two sections. 
2.2 Petri Net Modeling 
Petri nets were used to provide a formal representation of the 
functions, and the information flows and interactions between 
them. Petri nets (Fig. 1) consist of places (circles) that 
represent conditions, transitions (rectangles) representing 
tasks, and arrows that lead from input places to transitions 
and from transitions to output places. Tokens (small circles 
that may have multiple colors as identities) are placed inside 
places when the corresponding conditions are true. 
Transitions fire (i.e., tasks are performed) once tokens are 
present in their input places, which results in removing 
tokens from the input places and adding tokens to the output 
places. When a transition fires the net moves to a new state 
(i.e., configuration of tokens in places). Using Petri nets it is 
possible to identify issues associated with allocating the 
separation assurance tasks among agents, their information 
sharing, and the timeliness and synchronization of their 
actions. In this paper, the human or automation agents are 
represented as tokens: If a task is allocated to the human, the 
automation, or both, then a human token, an automation 
token, or both, respectively, are needed in input places for it 
to fire. This representation enables modeling dynamic 
allocations, where if a task is allocated to either the human or 
the automation, it may be executed by one or the other 













Fig. 1. Petri nets basic components. 
2.3 Behavior and Automation Level Analysis 
The criteria used to guide function allocation between the 
human and the automation started from Fitts’ 1951 list of 
men are better at – machines are better at (MABA-MABA). 
More recently, Sheridan proposed in his supervisory control 
theory a systematic approach where each function is 
characterized along two dimensions: physiological locus 
(consisting of sensory, cognitive or response activities) and 
behavior level, based on Rasmussen’s knowledge-based, 
rule-based and skill-based model (Sheridan 1992). Sheridan 
suggested that skill-based functions be allocated to task-
interactive automation, rule-based functions be allocated to a 
human-interactive computer, while Knowledge-based 
functions requiring experience are allocated to the human 
supervisor. Recently (Cummings 2014) suggested the 
addition of an expert level of behavior and related these 
levels to the uncertainty involved in a task (Fig. 2). She also 
suggested allocating functions to the human and the 
automation according to these behavior levels: A skill-based 
function involves reliable state and sensor information and is 
  
     
 
most suitable for automation. A rule-based function is a good 
candidate for automation is the rule set if well established and 
tested. A knowledge-based function can be partially 
automated to assist with data manipulation to support human 
decisions. Finally, human reasoning is needed for expert-
based function with possible help from the automation.  
 
Fig. 2. Human behavior and automation (Cummings 2014). 
 
Because of the low concept maturity, the tasks in this analysis 
are not defined in sufficient detail to be characterized based 
on the physiological locus (for example, making decisions 
based on aural versus visual capabilities of the human versus 
the automation in a sensory activity). Therefore, the tasks 
were characterized by only three behavior levels: skill, rule, 
and knowledge. Then the key tasks identified were allocated 
to the seven levels of automation (LOA) shown in Table 1, 
which is a subset of the automation levels identified by 
Sheridan (Sheridan 1992). 
Table 1.  Levels of Automation (LOA)  
LOA Automation Level Description 
1 No automation assistance, human take all decisions 
2 
The automation presents few alternatives, the human 
decides which one to select 
3 
The automation presents one alternative, the human 
decides to select it or not 
4 
The automation allows the human a restricted time to 
veto, then it executes 
5 
The automation executes automatically, then necessarily 
informs the human  
6 
The automation executes automatically, informs the 
human only if it (the automation) decides to 
7 
The automation decides everything and ignores the 
human 
3. Conflict Detection Scenario 
A typical conflict detection (CD) scenario is shown in Fig. 3, 
involving an ownship aircraft (which is conducting the CD 
task) and an intruder aircraft representing surrounding traffic. 
The scenario highlights the multiple trajectories that the 
aircraft may follow and hence the complexity of the decision 
as to which trajectories should be probed for conflict. Each 
aircraft broadcasts its state vector and its intent specified as 
trajectory change reports (TCR) and a target state which 
identifies the end state if the aircraft is currently turning or 
changing altitude. The intent and state projection may 
coincide as for the ownship or may be different as for the 
intruder. This scenario shows a potential conflict between the 












Fig. 3. Conflict detection scenario. 
Fig. 4 shows a Petri net model of the AOP instantiation of 
this scenario. Each task (transition) is colored red if it is skill-
based, yellow if rule-based, and blue if knowledge-based. 
Multiple color shading is used if the task is believed to have 
multiple behavior levels.  The ownship has three alternative 
trajectories: the planned trajectory in the Flight Management 
System (FMS), the commanded trajectory based on the 
guidance settings currently engaged, and a trajectory 
projection of the current state. The transition “select 
primary/secondary trajectory ownship” selects from these 
trajectories one for a “primary CD” task and one for a 
“secondary CD” task, according to a set of rules: it uses the 
commanded trajectory for primary CD except when the 
aircraft is currently coupled (the guidance settings match the 
trajectory in the FMS) with a predicted decoupling (For 
example predicted command to start a descent). In this case it 
uses the planned trajectory for primary CD and the 
commanded for secondary CD. Therefore, the transition 
“select ownship trajectory for secondary CD” needs tokens in 
the predicted decoupling and coupled status to fire. The 
“Select Primary/Secondary Trajectory Traffic” selects one 
trajectory based on the following rule: use the traffic intent 
based on the TCR, if TCR is not available based on the target 
state, if not available based on a state projection. The primary 
and secondary CD tasks are rule-based: If uncertainty bounds 
  
     
 
around the trajectories overlap then a conflict is detected 
(Karr 2006). Primary and secondary conflicts can be present 
at the same time which is represented by separate “Display 
Primary” and “Display Secondary” transitions that are skill-
based and easily automated. 
 
Fig. 4. Petri net model of conflict detection scenario. 
The scenario in Figure 3 shows that there could be a benefit 
in including the pilot in this decision, hence the double color 
assigned to the tasks of trajectory selection in Fig. 4. In this 
scenario, according to its current implementation, AOP 
would probe the Ownship intent against the intruder (traffic) 
intent only and not detect a conflict. If the intruder did not 
follow its intent and traveled along the state projection, a 
conflict would happen, potentially with a short warning time 
for the pilot to react. This is a typical blunder situation that 
can be mitigated by the automation also probing the 
projection of the intruder current state as a secondary 
trajectory. The pilot may, if given the opportunity, decide 
based on experience to either trust the traffic to follow its 
intent or to avoid the potential blunder. The uncertainty of the 
situation motivates including the pilot in the decision making, 
however, at the expense of increased pilot workload. This 
scenario also highlights that airborne conflict detection is 
potentially more complex than ground-based conflict 
detection: In the airborne situation the ownship does not 
control the intruder and pilot-pilot coordination is not 
common. On the other hand, in the ground-based situation, 
the controller controls both aircraft and controller-pilot 
coordination is common practice.  
4. Conflict Resolution Scenario 
A resolution maneuver has to be selected for a conflict that is 
assessed to need resolution, for example if within a certain 
time horizon. AOP selects from two conflict resolution (CR) 
algorithms: strategic and tactical intent-based CR 
denominated SICR and TICR. As notionally presented in Fig. 
5, SICR provides resolution maneuvers that follow particular 
patterns such as route offsets, return to the flight plan, and 
meet constraints (such as a required time of arrival (RTA)). 
SICR resolutions are complete route changes that can be 
implemented in the FMS. On the other hand, TICR uses 
tactical (heading or altitude) deviations that disregard 
constraints and are faster to compute. However, TICR tactical 
resolutions are open ended and hence require a recovery 
trajectory to return to the FMS route.  
 
Fig. 5. Conflict resolution scenario. 
The Petri net model in Fig. 6 represents the selection decision 
between the two resolution algorithms in AOP. The existence 
of a primary conflict token in the Primary Conflict to Solve 
place fires the task “check time to first loss of separation 
(LOS)”, which is skill based automated task that produces a 
token to either the above SICR threshold (set currently at five 
minutes) or to the below SICR threshold places. The “use 
SICR” task is rule-based: If the aircraft is in coupled status 
and the time to first LOS is above the threshold then SICR is 
enabled. Similarly, the “use TICR” task is rule-based and 
represented by three transitions that are enabled if: either the 
time to the first LOS is below the threshold from the onset, or 
SICR did not find a solution before the time to first LOS slips 
below the threshold, or the aircraft is in decoupled status. At 
any point, the pilot can use a “manual override” knowledge-
based task to disable SICR and enable TICR, representing the 
pilot overriding the automation by switching from SICR to 
TICR earlier than the automated switch threshold. For 
example, based on circumstances that are difficult to foresee 
by the automation, the pilot may decide to speed up the 
resolution since TICR has fewer constraints and therefore a 
bigger solution space, however, at the expense of a recovery 
after the resolution. Both “SICR” and “TICR” are rule-based 
tasks that are performed according to predesigned algorithms. 
  
     
 
They both need criteria that are created according to either 
rule-based defaults (The most efficient resolutions in terms of 
fuel/time are ranked the highest) or knowledge-based human 
generated criteria. Finally, the pilot “selects resolution” from 
a list of proposed resolutions using additional knowledge and 
intuition.  
In addition, AOP provides the pilot with the ability to “create 
manual resolution” which is a knowledge-based decision 
taken by the pilot based on the knowledge of the operational 
situation. For example, the current AFR rules dictate that if 
the automation of one aircraft in a conflict did not resolve it 
by a certain time then both aircraft automations attempt to 
resolve it. If not coordinated, this situation may result in 
cyclical instability leading to no convergence to a solution. 
The pilot is maintained as a safeguard to override the 
automation and resolve the conflict manually, preferably with 
coordination with the other pilot.  
 
Fig. 6. Petri net model of Conflict resolution scenario. 
5. Overall Function Allocation Analysis  
Three SMEs who are pilots and familiar with the AFR 
concept were presented with a list of abstracted tasks and 
asked to assign to each a behavior level among skill-, rule- 
and knowledge-based and a level of automation (LOA) that 
includes a sub-set of the Sheridan scale (Table 1). Table 2 
shows the ranges of the behavior level characterization and of 
the automation level allocation in the answers for each task. 
The following observations are made under each of the major 
task areas:  
Table 2.  Task Behavior level (BL) (S=Skill, R=Rule, 
K=Knowledge) and Automation Level (LOA)  
Task BL LOA 
C
I 
Select Own Trajectory for CD R 7 
Select Traffic Trajectory for CD R 7 
Select CD Time Horizon  R (K) 4 – 5 




Determine Time Urgency of 
Potential LOS 
R (K) 3 – 5 
Determine Cause of Potential LOS R – K 4 – 5 
Determine Certainty of Potential 
LOS 
R (K) 4 – 6 
Determine Complexity of Potential 
LOS 




Create Ranking Criteria for CR R – K 1 – 2 
Select Manual or Automated CR K 2 
Select Tactical versus Strategic CR R – K 2 – 4 
Select the Resolution Maneuvers R – K 2 – 4 
Select Time Horizon for CR R – K 5 – 7 
Select Constraints to Relax for CR R – K 3 – 5 
R
I 
Implement Selected Resolution 
S – R 
– K  
1 – 4 
 
5.1 Conflict Identification 
In addition to the selection of the ownship and traffic 
trajectories, two additional subtasks were identified for 
conflict detection: selecting the time horizon and selecting 
the separation criteria. There was a strong resistance by the 
SME’s to allocating a role to the pilot in conflict detection, 
particularly for the trajectory selection tasks. The argument 
was that it would distract the pilot from the main 
responsibility of safely flying the airplane. Hence the 
responsibility to detect conflicts should still be assigned to 
the ground-based controller or to the airborne automation but 
not to the human pilot. This result implies that the rules used 
by the automation should be sufficient without human input 
to ensure the safe operation of the flight. For example, the 
blunder situation presented in Section 3 should be avoided by 
expanding the automation rules to cover most possible 
trajectories. Limited roles for the pilot were considered in 
selecting a time horizon and the separation criteria for the 
detection. However, the functions were still characterized 
mostly as rule-based and recommended to be automated. The 
role of the pilot is to be informed by the automation or to be 
able to veto the automation to adjust the rules when desired. 
For example, the pilot may be risk averse and hence decide to 
add buffers to the automated separation minima or to increase 
the horizon of the detection to avoid, for example, frequent 
rolling detections with the same flight.  
5.2 Conflict Assessment 
Four criteria were hypothesized as potential factors that are 
needed to assess if a conflict should be resolved once 
identified or delayed until more information about it are 
available: (1) the time urgency of the conflict, for example, in 
  
     
 
terms of the time until LOS, (2) the cause of the conflict, for 
example, some conflicts may be caused by intent that is 
known to be wrongly transmitted, (3) the uncertainty of a 
conflict, for example, a conflict may be identified along a 
route that is unlikely to be followed by the traffic, and (4) the 
complexity of the conflict, for example, in terms of the 
number of flights involved. All the functions of determining 
these factors were believed to be mainly rule-based but to 
have knowledge-based elements. For example, the SME’s felt 
that most of the possible causes of the conflict should be 
known and hence based on a set of rules. However, one 
cannot rule out causes outside such rules that may arise and 
require knowledge-based behavior to assess. Similarly, the 
urgency and complexity of a conflict may depend on how 
busy the pilot is at the time.   
Despite the existence of the knowledge-based behavior, the 
SME inputs suggest that these functions should be mostly 
automated due to the high pilot workload needed for 
computation, interpretation and inference. For example, the 
human is known to perform poorly in assessing and 
interpreting probabilities. The role assigned to the human was 
higher than for conflict identification, but was limited to 
reacting to the automation assessment, through alternative 
selection or veto. 
5.3 Resolution Selection  
Six subtasks were identified for resolution selection: (1) 
creating ranking criteria for the selection, such as based on 
fuel efficiency or maneuver complexity, (2) selecting manual 
or automated resolution where the pilot may decide to resolve 
a conflict manually as explained in Fig. 6, (3) selecting 
strategic or tactical resolutions as explained in Fig. 5, (4) 
selecting a time horizon over which the trajectory should be 
free of conflict, for example ten or twenty minutes, (5) 
selecting the specific resolution trajectory/maneuvers such as 
using altitude or path stretching, and (6) selecting constraints 
to relax such as allowing the violation of time schedule 
constraints.  
Most functions were characterized to have rule-based and 
knowledge-based elements, except the selection of the 
manual or automated resolution which was characterized as 
knowledge-based and assigned to the pilot with limited 
automation role to present alternatives. The SME’s 
commented that one benefit of this manual task is to build the 
knowledge of the pilot in this new responsibility through 
involvement.  
Similarly, the pilot was given a significant role in the tasks of 
selecting ranking criteria, tactical or strategic resolution, the 
resolution maneuvers, and the constraints to relax. The pilot 
is recommended to maintain the ability to select from 
alternatives suggested by the automation, or at least to be 
informed and be able to veto the automation selection. For 
example, the ranking criteria may be based on operational 
goals that are impacted by the knowledge and expertise of the 
pilot. While automation rules can be designed to minimize 
the use of tactical resolutions in favor of strategic more 
efficient resolutions, the pilot may decide to override these 
rules and switch to tactical resolution to resolve a conflict 
faster as explained in the scenario in Fig. 6. Similarly, default 
rules may be automated for the prioritization of the 
maneuvers to select or the constraints to relax, which help 
resolve conflicts without the pilot when under time pressure 
and help increase the trust of the pilot in the automation. 
However, providing alternatives to the pilot to choose from 
allows the pilot to bring information based on experience and 
expertise possibly not easily known by the automation. The 
automated rules can still prevent the pilot from selecting 
constraints that should not be violated such as active special 
use airspace. Finally, the selection of the resolution horizon is 
recommended to be automated, with potentially considering 
different horizons dynamically and a limited human role.  
5.4 Resolution Implementation 
The LOA ranged between 1, human take all decisions with no 
automation assistance, and 4, representing that the 
automation allows the human a restricted time to veto, then it 
executes. Currently the pilot is in charge of performing this 
task. However, the SME answers indicated that “executing a 
maneuver should be second nature to pilots”, which is the 
definition of skill-based behavior. It was mentioned that in 
the near future the automation could be in complete control 
of the execution of the trajectory/maneuver of the aircraft. 
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